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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requires blending increasing quantities of biofuels into
theU.S. surface vehicle fuel supply. In 2013, the fraction of ethanol in the gasoline pool effectively
reached10%, the ethanol capacity of the dominant U.S. gasoline blend (the “E10 blend wall”). During
2013-2015,the price of RINs—tradeable electronic certificates for complying with the
RFS—fluctuated through a wide range, largely because of changes in actual and expected policy
combined with learning about the implications of the E10 blend wall. RINs are sold by biofuels
producers and purchased by obligated parties (refiners and importers), who must retire RINs in
proportion to the petroleum they sell for surface transportation. As a result, RINs in effect serve as
a charge on obligated fuels and a corrective subsidy for lower-carbon renewable fuels, and are neutral
for fuels outside the RFS. In theory, RIN prices provide incentives to consumers to use fuels with a
high renewable content and to biofuels producers to produce those fuels, and as such are a key
mechanism of the RFS. 
This paper examines the extent to which RIN prices are passed through to the price of obligated fuels,
and provides econometric results that complement the graphical analysis in Burkholder (2015). We
analyze daily data on RINs and fuel prices from January 1, 2013 through March 10, 2015. When we
examine wholesale prices on comparable obligated and non-obligated fuels, for example the spread
between diesel and jet fuel in the U.S. Gulf, we find that that roughly one-half to three-fourths of a
change in RIN prices is passed through to obligated fuels in the same day as the RIN price movement,
and this fraction rises over the subsequent few business days. Using six different wholesale spreads
between obligated and non-obligated fuels, we estimate a pooled long-run pass-through coefficient
of 1.01 with a standard error of 0.12. 
We also examine the transmission of RIN prices to retail fuel prices. The net RIN obligation on E10is
essentially zero over this period, and indeed we find no statistical evidence linking changes in RIN
prices to changes in E10 prices. We also examine the price of E85 which, with an estimated average
of 74% ethanol, generates more RINs than it obligates and thus in principle receives a large RIN
subsidy. In contrast to the foregoing results, which are consistent with theory, the pass-through of
RIN prices to the E85-E10 spread is precisely estimated to be zero if one adjusts for seasonality (as
we argue should be done), or if not, is at most 30%. Over this period, on average high RIN prices
did not translate into discounted prices for E85.
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1. Introduction 
 
The U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requires the blending of increasing quantities 
of biofuels into the U.S. surface vehicle transportation fuel supply. Developed initially in 2005 
and expanded in the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, the goals of the 
RFS program are to reduce both greenhouse gas emissions and US dependence on oil imports. 
The RFS requirements are met through a system of tradable compliance permits called RINs 
(“Renewable Identification Numbers”).  
RINs are generated when a renewable fuel is produced or imported and are detached 
when the renewable fuel is blended with petroleum fuel for retail sale, at which point RINs can 
be traded. Refiners and refined-petroleum product importers (“obligated parties”) must hand in 
(“retire”) RINs annually to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in proportion to the 
number of gallons of non-renewable fuels they sell into the surface transportation fuel pool. The 
sale of a RIN by a biofuel producer to an obligated party serves as a tax on petroleum fuels and a 
corrective subsidy to renewable fuels, and is revenue-neutral across the fuel market as a whole. 
This paper examines the extent to which RIN prices are passed through to wholesale and 
retail fuel prices. This question is of interest for several reasons. First, if RIN prices are less than 
fully passed through to wholesale fuel prices, then an obligated party with a net RIN obligation is 
left with net RIN price exposure, so that an increase in RIN prices creates a financial burden on 
the obligated party that is not recouped by higher refined product prices. Second, the goal of the 
RFS is to increase the consumption of renewable fuels, and in theory the market mechanism 
whereby that happens is by RIN prices passing through to reduced pump prices for fuels with 
high renewable content and to increased pump prices for fuels with low renewable content. Thus 
a central question for the RFS is whether this pass-through of RIN prices occurs at the retail 
level. Third, a more general question on which there is a large literature concerns the pass-
through of costs to wholesale and retail fuel prices. The costs studied here, RIN prices, fluctuate 
substantially on a daily basis, providing an opportunity to estimate dynamic pass-through 
relations at the daily level. 
Through 2012, RIN prices were low, and the RIN market received little public attention. 
Starting in the winter of 2013, however, RIN prices rose sharply in response to an enhanced 
understanding that the RFS volumetric standards were approaching the capacity of the fuel 
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supply to absorb additional ethanol through the predominant blend, E10, which is up to 10% 
ethanol, referred to in the industry as the “E10 blend wall.” Throughout 2013-2015, RIN prices 
fluctuated through a wide range. These fluctuations have been widely and convincingly 
attributed by market observers and academics as stemming from the E10 blend wall combined 
with policy developments concerning the direction of the RFS (Irwin (2013a,b, 2014), Lade, Lin, 
and Smith (2014)). As a result, these RIN price fluctuations serve as an exogenous source of 
variation that allows us to identify RIN price pass-through.  
The question of RIN price pass-through to retail fuels has been addressed recently by the 
EPA in the context of its proposed rule for the 2014, 2015, and 2016 standards under the RFS 
(Burkholder (2015)). That work examines the link between RIN prices and refined fuels by 
examining the relationship between price spreads on physically comparable fuels with different 
RIN obligations to the value of the net RIN obligation of that spread. For example, diesel fuel 
and jet fuel have similar chemical compositions, but diesel fuel is obligated under the RFS 
whereas jet fuel is not. Thus the spread between the spot prices of diesel and jet fuel, both in the 
U.S. Gulf, provides a comparison that in theory should reflect the price of the RIN obligation of 
diesel fuel under the RFS while controlling for factors that affect the overall price of oil, local 
supply disruptions, and evolving features of the petroleum market that might affect the diesel-
gasoline spread or the crack spread. In the retail market, Burkholder (2015) also examines the 
spread between E85, a fuel with between 51% and 83% ethanol, and E10, the dominant fuel 
during this period, which contains up to 10% ethanol. As is explained in the next section, during 
this period the net RIN obligation from blending E10 is essentially zero, so Burkholder (2015) 
also examines the effect of daily RIN price fluctuations on E10 prices. 
 This paper complements the analysis in Burkholder (2105). Burkholder’s (2015) analysis 
is based on inspection of time series plots. The main contribution of this paper is to use 
econometric methods to estimate the extent of pass-through, to estimate pass-through dynamics, 
and to quantify the sampling uncertainty of these estimates. Like Burkholder (2015), we examine 
the link between fuel price spreads and the value of net RIN obligation of those fuels. We also 
use a longer data set and examine some wholesale spreads between obligated and non-obligated 
fuels not examined in Burkholder (2015).
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 For diesel, these spreads are the spread between U.S. diesel and jet fuel (both in the Gulf; diesel is obligated but jet 
fuel is not) and U.S. diesel and diesel sold into the European market (and thus not subject to the RFS), specifically 
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The empirical analysis in this paper examines both the long-run pass-through coefficient 
and the short-run pass-through dynamics. We examine the long-run pass-through using levels 
regressions. Because many of these prices fluctuate seasonally, our base specifications control 
for seasonality. Even in thick wholesale markets, this pass-through might not be immediate for 
various reasons including information lags. We therefore examine the dynamic pass-through of 
RIN prices using both structural vector autoregressions and distributed lag regressions. 
This paper also relates to the substantial literature estimating the pass-through of changes 
in crude oil prices to retail prices, as well as whether this pass-through depends on the direction 
of the change in crude prices; see, for example, Borenstein et al. (1997), Bachmeier and Griffin 
(2003), and Lewis (2011). Relative to this literature, the contribution of this paper is to examine 
pass-through for this specific cost which is central to the design and operation of the RFS, and to 
provide additional evidence on price pass-through dynamics at the daily level. 
Section 2 provides additional background on RINs, the RFS program, and RIN 
obligations. Section 3 describes the data. The regression methods and results are presented in 
Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. RINs and the RFS Program 
 
The RFS program divides renewable fuels into four nested categories: total renewable, 
advanced, biomass-based diesel (BBD), and cellulosic. Under the EISA, each of these four 
categories has its own volumetric requirements, which the EPA translates into four 
corresponding fractional requirements through annual rulemakings. As is shown in Figure 1, 
these categories are defined by the reduction in life-cycle emissions of greenhouse gasses 
(GHGs), relative to petroleum, by feedstock, and by fuel characteristics. 
Production of renewable fuels generates RINs, and there are four types of RINs 
corresponding to the different categories of fuel under the RFS: cellulosic fuels generate D3 
RINs, BBD generates D4 RINs, advanced non-cellulosic non-BBD fuels generate D5 RINs, and 
conventional fuels (renewable fuels that meet the 80% lifecycle GHG emissions reduction 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the New York Harbor diesel – Rotterdam diesel spread and the U.S. Gulf diesel – Rotterdam diesel spread. For 
gasoline, these spreads are the New York Harbor RBOB (reformulated blendstock for oxygenate blending) – Euro- 
BOB spread (RBOB is obligated, Euro-BOB is not), and the spread between New York Harbor RBOB – Brent oil 
and Los Angeles RBOB – Brent oil. 
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requirement, but do not qualify as advanced biofuels) generate D6 RINs. During the period of 
the data, most of the renewable fuels produced were conventional (primarily corn ethanol), 
followed by biomass-based diesel and advanced biofuels. As a fraction of the overall market, a 
negligible amount of cellulosic biofuels were produced during this period so D3 RINs are 
ignored for the empirical analysis here. 
The annual RFS regulations specify that for each gallon of petroleum fuel (diesel or 
gasoline) blended into the fuel supply, a minimum fraction of a gallon of each category of 
renewable fuels must also be blended. Compliance with this mandate is demonstrated by turning 
in RINs with the EPA. The compliance system is nested, so a D4 RIN can be used to 
demonstrate compliance with the BBD mandate, the Total Advanced mandate, or the Total 
Renewable mandate. Similarly, a D5 RIN can be used to demonstrate compliance with the Total 
Advanced or Total Renewable mandate. A D6 RIN can only be used to demonstrate compliance 
with the Total Renewable mandate. During 2013, there were 13,351 million D6 RINs generated, 
almost entirely from corn ethanol, there were 558 million D5 RINs generated, slightly over 80% 
of which were produced by advanced non-cellulosic ethanol (mainly Brazilian cane ethanol), 
there were 2,739 million D4 RINs, corresponding to 1,765 million wet gallons of biomass-based 
diesel, and there were 0.4 million D3 RINs generated. 
Figure 2 shows RIN prices for the period of our data, January 1, 2013 – March 10, 2015. 
For the purpose of the empirical research in this paper, this was a period of high RIN price 
volatility, primarily in 2013 but also, to a lesser extent, in 2014-15. In the winter of 2013, D6 
RIN prices rose from under $0.10 to much higher prices, hitting at $1.40 in the summer of 2013 
before falling back to under $0.30 in the late fall of 2013. Prices were more stable during 2014, 
although they rose in the winter of 2014-15. As discussed in Burkholder (2015), the initial rise in 
RIN prices in the winter of 2013 stemmed from increasing market awareness that the RFS 
standards were approaching or exceeding the so-called E10 blend wall, the amount of ethanol 
that can be blended into E10, the dominant blend of gasoline which is up to 10% ethanol. As is 
suggested by the event markers in Figure 2 and as is discussed in detail by Irwin (2013a,b, 2014) 
and Lade, Lin, and Smith (2014), the subsequent variations in RIN prices arose in large part 
because of changing expectations about future RFS policy, including a leaked proposal for 2014 
volumes, a 2014 proposal which was never finalized, and EPA public statements indicating 
evolving policy, and repeated delays of proposed standards for 2015. More generally, the 
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movements in RIN prices over this period were not linked to economic growth, shifts in diesel 
vs. gasoline demand, or other features that might affect price spreads between obligated and non-
obligated fuels other than through RIN prices themselves. 
Two additional features of the RIN prices in Figure 2 bear comment. First, because of the 
nested structure, the RIN prices satisfy the inequalities, PD4  PD5  PD6. Second, during most of 
this period, the three RIN prices tracked each other closely. The reason for this is that during 
most of this period, biodiesel was being produced in excess of its volumetric requirement and D4 
RINs were being used to satisfy the total advanced and total renewable requirements. 
Fractional RIN obligation. During the time period of our data, the only fractional 
standards that were subject to a final rulemaking were the 2013 standards. For each gallon of 
petroleum gasoline or diesel sold into the surface fuels market, the 2013 standards required 
retiring with EPA 0.0113 D4 RINs to meet the BBD standard, 0.0162 D4 or D5 RINs to meet the 
Total Advanced standard, and 0.0974 D4, D5, or D6 RINs to meet the Total Renewable 
standard; because of the RFS nesting structure, a D4 RIN retired to meet the BBD standard also 
counts towards the Total Advanced and Total Renewable standard. Assuming the Total 
Advanced residual requirement is met by turning in 0.0049 (= 0.0162 - 0.0113) D5 RINs and the 
Total Renewable residual (i.e. conventional) requirement is met by turning in 0.0812 (= 0.0974 - 
0.0162) RINs, the value of the 2013 RIN obligation to an obligated party, per gallon of 
petroleum fuel sold into the transportation market, is: 
 
PRIN bundle = .0113PD4  + .0049PD5 + .0812PD6,    (1) 
 
where PD4, PD5, and PD6 are the price of a D4, D5, and D6 RIN, respectively.
2
 Because each of 
the wholesale spreads is the price difference between an obligated fuel and an exempt fuel, the 
value of the per-gallon RIN obligation in (1) is the predicted per-gallon RIN price effect on each 
of the wholesale spreads.  
The predicted RIN price obligation on retail fuels depends on the fractions of gallons of 
petroleum and renewable fuel blended into a gallon of retail fuel. Specifically, we also examine 
                                                          
2
 Because of the nested structure, the Total Advanced residual (Total Advanced minus BBD standards) can be met 
with either a D5 RIN or a D4 RIN generated by BBD production in excess of the BBD standard. Because of market 
arbitrage, however, even if the Total Advanced residual is met by an excess D4 RIN, then the D4 and D5 RIN prices 
will be the same, so (1) still provides the value of the RIN bundle.  
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the pass-through of RIN prices to retail (pump) prices of E10 and E85 (which can be between 
51% and 83% ethanol). Blending one gallon of E10 generates 0.1 D6 RINs, but obligates 0.9 
gallons of RIN obligations. The Energy Information Administration has estimated that, on 
average, E85 is 74% ethanol, so blending 1 gallon of E85 generates 0.74 D6 RINs and entails 
0.26 gallons of RIN obligations. Thus, for these two retail fuels, the value of the net RIN 
obligations are:
3
 
 
Net E10 RIN obligation price = -0.1PD6 + 0.9 PRIN bundle    (2) 
Net E85 RIN obligation price = -0.74PD6 + 0.26 PRIN bundle    (3) 
 
For example, if the prices of D4, D5, and D6 RINs are all one dollar, then the price of the RIN 
bundle is 0.097, the net E10 RIN obligation is -0.012, and the net E85 RIN obligation is -0.715. 
For RIN prices observed since 2013, the basic pattern is that the net E10 RIN obligation is near 
zero and negative, while the net E85 RIN obligation is large and negative. Diesel, which is not 
considered in this study, has a small positive net RIN obligation over this period. 
The price of the net RIN obligation for the E85-E10 spread is the difference in the net 
RIN obligation prices of the respective fuels: 
 
 = Net E85 RIN obligation price  – Net E10 RIN obligation price. (4) 
 
3. The Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data consist of daily fuel and D4, D5, and D6 RIN prices from January 1, 2013 to 
March 10, 2015. Prices on D4, D5, and D6 RINs are from Progressive Fuels Limited (PFL).
4
 
                                                          
3
 Equations (2) and (3) make two approximations: (a) all the ethanol blended into E10 and E85 is conventional 
(corn) ethanol, however in reality some of this ethanol is cane ethanol that generates a D5 RIN; (b) all biodiesel 
generates D4 RINs, however in reality some biodiesel generates D5, D6, and D7 RINs. However the omitted 
volumes are small so these approximations have negligible effect on the predicted net RIN obligation prices. 
4
 RIN price data from PFL are proprietary. PFL can be reached online at www.progressivefuelslimited.com and by 
phone at 239-390-2885. Our PFL data end November 30, 2014, and were filled in using OPIS data. The OPIS data 
has some missing values (most notably D5 prices for January 2015), which were filled in using Bloomberg. Some 
missing values remained, all for D5 RINs in January 2015, and those missing values were filled in using data from 
the most recent nonmissing trading day. These RIN prices are traded prices and do not necessarily reflect prices 
embedded long-term contracts for RINs. 
, 85 10,
net
RIN E E tP 
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Domestic wholesale prices were obtained from the Energy Information Administration:
5
 
NYMEX prompt-month futures prices for reformulated blendstock for oxygenated blending 
(RBOB)-New York Harbor, and spot prices for Brent oil, RBOB-Los Angeles, Ultra-low sulfur 
No. 2 diesel-New York Harbor and U.S. Gulf Coast, and Kerosene-type jet fuel-U.S. Gulf Coast. 
Two wholesale European prices, reported by Argus, were used: the Rotterdam barge German 
diesel (10ppm sulfur) price, and the price of European blendstock for oxygenated blending 
(EBOB), FOB Rotterdam (both quoted in dollars per tonne, converted to dollars per gallon). 
Retail fuels prices for diesel, E10, and E85 are national average pump prices produced by the 
American Automobile Association and reported by (and downloaded from) Bloomberg.
6
 
Weekends and U.S. holidays were dropped, so the resulting data are for U.S. business 
days. In some cases we aggregate the data to weekly, by which we mean five consecutive 
business days. 
From these data, we constructed six wholesale spreads and one retail spread (E85-E10) 
which, along with changes in E10 prices, are the focus of the analysis. Recall that obligated fuels 
are those sold for use in the surface transportation sector in the United States; non-obligated fuels 
are fuels used in Europe and fuels used domestically for purposes other than surface 
transportation, such as jet fuel. The wholesale prices are the price differences, in dollars per 
gallon, between a fuel that is obligated under the RFS and a similar fuel that is not obligated: 
 
Diesel spreads  
Gulf diesel-jet fuel spread = Ultra-low sulfur No. 2 diesel spot, U.S. Gulf – Jet fuel, U.S. 
Gulf 
NY-Rotterdam diesel spread = Ultra-low sulfur No. 2 diesel spot, New York Harbor – 
Barge diesel, Rotterdam 
Gulf-Rotterdam diesel spread = Ultra-low sulfur No. 2 diesel spot, U.S. Gulf – Barge 
diesel, Rotterdam 
 
                                                          
5
 Spot prices were downloaded from http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm, and futures prices were 
downloaded from http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_fut_s1_d.htm. 
6
 The only adjustment for outliers was for the E85 price, which has five episodes of large measured price changes 
that are reversed within one to four days and appear to be measurement errors; these observations were omitted from 
the regressions. 
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BOB spreads (wholesale) 
NY RBOB-EBOB spread = RBOB prompt-month futures, New York – EBOB, 
Rotterdam 
NY RBOB-Brent spread = RBOB prompt-month futures, New York – Brent spot 
LA RBOB-Brent spread = RBOB spot, Los Angeles – Brent spot 
 
In addition, we consider the retail fuel E85-E10 spread (= E85 price – E10 price).7 
Summary statistics. Table 1 provides the mean and standard deviation of the seven 
spreads, the E10 price, and the net RIN obligations. The standard deviations of the wholesale 
refined product spreads over this period are less than $0.10. The RBOB-Brent spreads have a 
larger standard deviation, reflecting in part seasonal movements in RBOB. The value of the net 
RIN bundle for these wholesale fuels averaged $0.056 over this period, with a standard deviation 
which is one-half to one-fourth that of the refined product spreads. The largest fluctuations are in 
the E10 price, which moved significantly over this period both for seasonal reasons and because 
of the sharp drop in oil prices starting in July 2014. The net RIN obligation on the E85-E10 
spread is large and negative, averaging $0.393/gallon over this period. Notably, the standard 
deviation of the E85-E10 net RIN obligation exceeds the standard deviation of the E85-E10 
spread by one-fourth; this large variation in the E85-E10 net RIN obligation this sample provides 
an opportunity for precise estimation of RIN pass-through to E85. The fact that the standard 
deviation of the E85-E10 net RIN obligation exceeds that of the spread is suggestive of 
incomplete pass-through, however in principle this inequality also could arise with complete 
long-run pass-through where the retail spread smooths out high frequency fluctuations in the net 
RIN obligation, a possibility examined in the regression analysis in the next section. 
Time series plots. Figures 3-5 plot, respectively, the time series data on the wholesale 
diesel spreads, the RBOB spreads, and the E85-E10 spread along with the value of the RIN 
obligation per gallon of petroleum, all in dollars per gallon. First consider the wholesale spreads. 
There are several common features of the data that are evident across the time series. First, many 
of the spreads show seasonal patterns. This is particularly the case for the BOB-Brent spreads: 
                                                          
7
 Another spread of interest is the pump diesel-E10 spread. Pump diesel has a lower renewable content than E10 so 
entails a net RIN obligation, however this RIN obligation is small, with small variation over the sample compared to 
variation in the pump diesel-E10 spread, making econometric analysis of the pump diesel-E10 spread challenging. 
We therefore leave analysis of the pump diesel-E10 spread 
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from 2006-2015, seasonals explains half the variance in the daily NY RBOB-Brent spread and 
have a range of $0.30. There are also seasonal patterns in the diesel spreads, although they are 
smaller, for example the range of seasonal fluctuations in the Gulf diesel – Gulf jet fuel spread is 
approximately $0.05.
8
 Second, several of the series have substantial high-frequency noise in the 
form of quickly reverting prices. This is particularly true for the NY-Rotterdam and Gulf-
Rotterdam diesel spreads, but also for the NY RBOB – EBOB spread and the E85-E10 spread. 
Third, while the range of variation of the diesel spreads is roughly the same as the RIN price 
obligation, the BOB and retail spreads vary over much larger ranges than the RIN price 
obligation, consistent with the standard deviations in Table 1. 
Consistent with the analysis in Burkholder (2015), the wholesale spreads in Figures 3 and 
4 broadly move with the RIN obligation price; however, variation in the RIN obligation price is 
just one of many reasons for movements in these spreads. Some of these non-RIN movements 
are idiosyncratic to certain spreads, for example the spikes in the NY-Rotterdam diesel spread 
during the late winters of 2014 and 2015, indicating temporarily tight markets for diesel and 
heating oil in the Northeast U.S. Other non-RIN movements are more persistent, such as the 
decline in the NY RBOB-EBOB spread during the summer of 2014 at a time that the value of the 
RIN obligation was slowly increasing.  
Figure 5 presents mixed evidence on the comovements of the E85-E10 spread and its net 
RIN obligation price. E85 prices fell, relative to E10, during the spring and summer of 2013 as 
RIN prices initially rose (and the net E85-E10 RIN obligation price fell, because E85 is a 
renewables-heavy fuel), however E85 prices rose only slightly as RIN prices fell in the fall of 
2013, and through 2014 and 2015 fluctuations in the RIN obligation price appear less connected 
to the spread.  
Scatterplots. The plots in Figures 3-5 show broad trends but do not illustrate the link 
between timing in changes in RIN prices and the fuel spread. Figures 6-8 therefore provide an 
initial look at the link between changes in the value of the RIN bundle and the change in the 
spread. For these scatterplots, the data are aggregated to weekly averages and the changes are 
weekly changes of weekly averages (the weeks are the five business days ending on Tuesday to 
minimize missing weeks due to holidays).  
                                                          
8
 These seasonal statistics are computed by regressing the spread on the seasonal variables discussed in Section 4, 
using data from October 2005-March 2015 for the NY RBOB-Brent spread and from June 2006-March 2015 for the 
Gulf diesel-jet fuel spread, the full period for which EIA provides these data. 
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For the wholesale fuels (Figures 6 and 7), the scatterplots show the weekly change in the 
spread vs. the weekly change in the RIN price obligation in the same week. The scatterplots 
generally show a positive association between changes in RIN prices and changes in the 
wholesale spreads between obligated and non-obligated fuels. However, consistent with the 
spreads changing for many reasons other than RIN prices, the scatters are dispersed.  
Because of delays in pricing in retail fuels markets, the scatterplots for the retail fuels in 
Figure 8 show the weekly change in the E85-E10 spread (upper) and the change in the E10 price 
(lower) against the prior-week change in the net RIN obligation price. In contrast to the 
wholesale fuel scatterplot, the E85-E10 scatterplot shows very little evidence of pass-through, at 
least at this relatively short time lag. Because E10 has a net RIN obligation of approximately 
zero under the 2013 RFS standards, theory suggests that there would be little relationship 
between changes in RIN prices and changes in E10 prices, and the E10 scatterplots in Figure 8 
are consistent with this theoretical prediction of no relationship, whether the data are seasonally 
adjusted or not.
9
 These scatterplots, however, are not able to capture fully the dynamics of the 
RIN price-spread relationship; doing so requires turning to time series regressions. 
 
4. Time Series Analysis: Methods and Empirical Results 
 
We now turn to time series regression analysis of the relation between changes in the 
spreads and changes in the price of the net RIN obligation. The first set of specifications estimate 
levels relations with no lags which, as is discussed further below, have the interpretation of 
estimating the long-run pass-through coefficient. The second set of specifications uses vector 
autoregressions to estimate pass-through dynamics. In the vector autoregressions, the dynamic 
effect of a RIN price shock is identified by assuming that the shock to the RIN bundle is 
exogenous at the daily level. Finally, as a specification check we present a third set of results in 
which the dynamic pass-through is estimated using distributed lag regressions. In all cases, we 
initially present results for each spread individually. Generally speaking, we find that the pass-
through coefficients and their dynamics are similar across wholesale spreads, but are estimated 
imprecisely. Because the pass-through theory does not differentiate among wholesale spreads, 
                                                          
9
 For the purpose of Figure 8, the seasonally adjusted E10 series was by regression-based seasonal adjustment as 
described in Section 4, with the seasonal coefficients estimated over the period October 2006 to January 2012. 
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and because the markets are connected and have overlapping participants, we therefore estimate 
pooled specifications for the wholesale spreads in which the pass-through coefficients are 
constrained to be the same across spreads. 
Because of the seasonal movements in many of the prices, and because the 2013 RIN 
price increase in the spring and decline in the fall coincides with some seasonal fuel patterns, in 
all specifications the leading cases include seasonal adjustment. A typical method for seasonally 
adjusting monthly data is to include 11 monthly indicator variables, however with these daily 
data, monthly indicators would induce jumps between months. Instead, we use sines and cosines 
evaluated on calendar days at the first four seasonal harmonic frequencies.
10
 
Levels specifications. We begin by investigating the long-run pass-through relation 
between the level of the net RIN obligation price and the spreads, which is the focus of the 
discussion in Burkholder (2015).  
Visual inspection of Figures 2-5 indicates that, for the relatively short data span at hand, 
there are long swings (low-frequency movement, or persistence) in both the spreads and RIN 
prices. It is natural to expect the spreads to be revert to a mean value over a sufficiently long 
period, that is, for the spreads to be stationary. Over the short sample at hand, however, the 
assumption of stationarity might not be a good statistical description of these series. A large body 
of econometric methods and practice has developed around handling time series data with low-
frequency movements. The benchmark approach is to ascertain whether the series at hand are 
integrated of order zero or one and, if they are integrated of order one, whether they are 
cointegrated, that is, have common long-term movements. If the series are stationary but have 
long-term comovements, as is evident in the time series plots, or if the series are cointegrated, 
then regressions of the level of the spread on the level of the net RIN obligation price produce 
estimates of the long-term coefficient linking the two series, which in this case is the long-term 
pass-through coefficient. 
Table 2 summarizes the levels regression results for the individual series. First consider 
the unit root and cointegration tests reported in the lower panel of the table. The RIN prices 
                                                          
10
 Including the first six seasonal harmonics would be equivalent, with monthly data, to including twelve monthly 
indicators. Preliminary investigation indicated that the full six harmonics were not necessary so for parsimony the 
first four harmonics were used, and the results are robust to this choice. 
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appear to be well-approximated as having a unit root over the full sample.
11
 As can be seen in 
Table 2, there is more evidence against the unit root model for the spreads, with all but 3 of the 
12 unit root tests for wholesale spreads rejecting the unit root null at the 10% level. The notion 
that the RIN obligation price and the spread have different orders of integration is internally 
inconsistent and makes these results difficult to interpret. This said, five of the six cointegration 
tests reject non-cointegration, which suggests that if the unit root model is adopted then the 
assumption of cointegration is appropriate. With the preponderance of tests rejecting the unit root 
model, we focus on levels regressions estimated by OLS. Under the assumption that RIN prices 
are exogenous, inference on the OLS estimator is valid even if the series are cointegrated, 
however in that case the OLS estimator will be an inefficient estimator of the long-run relation. 
As a check, we therefore also report levels regressions estimated using the dynamic OLS 
(DOLS) efficient cointegration estimator.  
We now turn to the levels regression results for the six wholesale spreads. In all 
specifications, the units of the spread and the RIN price obligation align, so that a coefficient of 1 
corresponds to perfect pass-through. Five features of the wholesale spread regression results in 
Table 2 are noteworthy. 
First, for the base specification in row (1) (OLS in levels with the seasonal controls), the 
estimated coefficients range from 0.68 to 1.57. There is, however, a wide range of precision of 
the estimates, ranging from a tight standard error of 0.14 for the Gulf diesel-Rotterdam diesel 
spread to 0.70 for the L.A. RBOB-Brent spread. This precision is consistent with the large non-
RIN variation in several of these series evident in Figures 3 and 4. 
Second, there are only small differences between the DOLS and OLS estimators. This 
finding is consistent with the price of the RIN obligation being exogenous and indicates 
robustness of the long-run pass-through coefficient to whether the series are modeled as 
cointegrated. 
Third, for most of the series the estimated pass-through coefficient is sensitive to whether 
seasonals are included (compare regressions (4) and (1)). Because the seasonal coefficients are 
strongly statistically significant for all the spreads and, as discussed above, ignoring seasonals 
                                                          
11
 DF-GLS and augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, applied to the D4, D5, and D6 RIN price series with a 
constant (no drift, AIC lag selection), fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 10% level in 5 of the 6 
cases, and in the 6
th
 case rejects the unit root at the 10% but not 5% level. 
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has the potential for confounding movements in RIN prices with normal seasonal movements in 
the spreads, we will focus on the results that include the seasonal variables. 
Fourth, the subsample estimates are far more precise for 2013 than for 2014-15, 
consistent with 2013 being the period with the greatest fluctuation in RIN prices. Because these 
regressions span only a year, or just over a year, they do not include seasonal variables so serve 
here to confirm that most of the variation in the data is arising from the first half of the sample. 
Fifth, regression (3) augments the base set of seasonals (the first four harmonics) with 
two additional harmonics, so that they would be equivalent to monthly indicators in monthy data. 
Although using the base set of seasonal variables matters substantially for the results, the 
differences between using the base set and the augmented set of seasonal variables are 
negligible. 
A straightforward interpretation of the theory of pass-through provides no reason to think 
that the RIN pass-through should differ across the wholesale spreads, each of which compare an 
obligated fuel to a non-obligated counterpart. Table 3 therefore presents pooled levels regression 
in which the pass-through coefficient is constrained to be the same across series (all other 
coefficients, including seasonals, are unconstrained).  
The pooled levels regression results in Table 3 present strong evidence in favor of a 
precisely estimated unit pass-through coefficient. The regressions in Table 3 are for the three 
specifications in Table 2 that include seasonals. As expected, pooling improves the precision of 
the estimators, especially for the RBOB spreads. For diesel, the estimated pass-through 
coefficient is slightly greater than one, while for gasoline it is less than one, but in all cases it is 
within one standard deviation of one. When the six wholesale spreads are pooled, the long-run 
pass-through coefficient is estimated to be 1.01 using OLS or DOLS with the base set of 
seasonal variables, with a standard error of 0.12. 
The results for the E85-E10 retail spread, given in the final two columns of Table 2, are 
quite different than for the wholesale spreads. Three features of the E85-E10 results are 
noteworthy. First, regardless of the specification, the pass-through coefficient is in all cases small 
(the negative coefficients for 2014-15 are relatively imprecisely estimated and do not include 
seasonals so we put little weight on these estimates). Second, because of the large variation in the 
E85-E10 net RIN obligation price, the pass-through coefficients estimated using the full sample, 
and using the 2013 subsample, are all precisely estimated. Third, the results are sensitive to 
16 
 
whether seasonals are included. Unfortunately, unlike the wholesale spreads historical data on 
E85 prices are spotty and we are unable to examine historical seasonal fluctuations in the E85-
E10 spread. Because the average ethanol content of E85 varies seasonally, and because ethanol is 
less expensive than petroleum gasoline on a volumetric basis for most of this sample period, one 
would expect seasonal fluctuations in the E85-E10 spread and indeed the seasonal coefficients in 
the E85-E10 regressions are strongly statistically significant. These considerations lead us to put 
greater weight on the regressions including seasonals.  Fourth, consistent with the gasoline pass-
through literature, one would expect a delay between changes in the net RIN obligation price and 
when it shows up in retail prices, even with perfect long-run pass-through. The final column in 
Table 2 therefore presents regressions in which the net RIN obligation price is replaced by its 
value 20 business days (approximately one month) prior. With this modification, the negative 
coefficients in specifications (1) and (2) become approximately zero, and the OLS estimate 
without seasonals becomes 0.26. In short, ignoring seasonals yields a precisely estimated long-
run pass-through coefficient of roughly one-fourth; including seasonals, this coefficient is 
precisely estimated to be zero. 
Structural vector autoregressions by fuel spread. We now turn to an examination of the 
short-run pass-through dynamics between the net RIN obligation price and the spreads. We 
initially estimate the pass-through dynamics using bivariate structural vector autoregressions 
(SVARs), then in the next section compare the SVAR results to ones obtained from distributed 
lag models. 
The SVARs estimate the dynamic response of the two included variables, the net RIN 
obligation price and the spread, to a structural shock to the net RIN obligation price. Motivated 
by the discussion in Section 2, we identify the net RIN structural shock by assuming that it is 
uncorrelated at the daily level with any of the other news determining daily innovations in the 
spread; this corresponds to ordering the net RIN obligation price first in a Cholesky factorization. 
All SVARs include the base set seasonal variables. The SVARs are specified in differences, for 
two reasons. First, the bulk of the statistics in Table 2 on unit roots suggests that the variables are 
most plausibly treated as stationary. Second, this evidence is not clear-cut, and the estimates 
obtained from a levels specification will be consistent under unit roots with or without 
cointegration, although in the latter cases the levels VAR estimates will be inefficient. 
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Table 4 presents the SVAR estimates of the dynamic pass-through effect, specifically, the 
structural impulse response of the (level of the) spread to a shock to the net RIN obligation price, 
for the first 15 business days. As in the levels regression, there is considerable variation in 
precision across the VARs and, not surprisingly, the estimates of the dynamics are less precise 
than the estimates of the long-run relations. Still, several interesting patterns emerge. All the 
SVARs indicate that roughly half to two-thirds of the RIN price is passed through to the 
wholesale spread in the first day, and by the end of the business week the estimated pass-through 
is approximately 1, albeit quite imprecisely estimated for some of the series. As in the levels 
regressions, the most precise estimates are for the Gulf diesel-Gulf jet fuel spread and the Gulf 
diesel-Rotterdam diesel spread. 
Because the wholesale fuels markets are deep and many of the participants are the same, 
and because the theoretical effect of the RIN obligation price is the same for each of the spreads, 
we also estimated SVARs pooled across the wholesale spreads, in which the SVAR coefficients 
on the spread and the net RIN obligation price were constrained to be the same for each spread 
(seasonals were allowed to differ across spreads).
12
  
The pooled SVAR results are given in Table 5. The structural impulse response functions 
for diesel and for gasoline both show a large, but incomplete, impact effect, with a pass-through 
that rises over time, and the two sets of 3-fuel impulse response functions are within a standard 
error of each other. The 6-spread pooled results estimate a pass-through of 0.71 in the first day, 
rising to 0.90 after five business days. Even with pooling, the dynamic effects remain less 
precisely estimated than the levels long-run estimate, however there is substantial evidence 
consistent with large, but initially incomplete pass-through, that becomes complete pass-through 
after roughly one week.  
SVAR results for retail fuels are given in Table 6. The first three columns present 
different SVARs using daily data; the fourth column estimates a SVAR using weekly data 
(weeks ending in Tuesday, specified in first differences as an additional specification check). As 
is the case in the levels regressions, the SVAR results for E85-E10 are quite different than for the 
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 Specifically, this was implemented by estimating a VAR with n spreads and the RIN price obligation, for n+1 
variables. The constrained n+1 variable SVAR imposed no feedback across spreads, coefficients at a given lag being 
equal across spreads, and the same structural impact coefficient, where the RIN price obligation ordered first in a 
Cholesky factorization. This is equivalent to estimating n bivariate SVARs constrained to have the same coefficients 
on the spread and the RIN obligation across each SVAR, but allowing different seasonals and intercepts for each 
spread. In the case n=1 this specializes to the bivariate SVARs in Table 4. 
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wholesale spreads. With or without seasonals, there is little evidence of pass-through within a 
week, although without seasonals there is evidence of perhaps 20% pass-through after three 
weeks in both the daily and weekly regressions. In the weekly regression, even after 8 weeks the 
pass-through is only 0.29, consistent with the more precise estimates of long-run pass-through 
obtained from the levels regressions in Table 2 without seasonals. If seasonals are included, then 
the dynamic pass-through of RIN prices to E85 is essentially zero. 
Finally, theory predicts that E10 prices should not be affected by RIN prices, and that is 
what is found in the SVAR in the final column of Table 6. 
Distributed lag regressions by fuel spread. An alternative approach to estimating the 
dynamic effect of a change in the net RIN obligation price is to use distributed lag regressions. 
As an additional check, these regressions are specified in first differences. The distributed lag 
regressions are of the form: 
 
Spreadi,t = i + i(L) , ,
net
RIN i tP  + γi′Wt + uit,      (5) 
 
where i varies across the spreads, i(L) is a lag polynomial, Wt are additional control variables in 
some of the specifications, and , ,
net
RIN i tP  is the price of the net RIN obligation bundle for that 
spread. The cumulative effect on the spread of a change in the net RIN obligation price after k 
days is the sum of the first k coefficients in the distributed lag polynomial i(L). 
The results for the individual spreads are summarized in Table 7. For comparability to the 
VAR results, the specifications include seasonal controls and are estimated over the full sample, 
and include the current value and fifteen lags of the net RIN obligation price so as to estimate the 
first fifteen cumulative dynamic multipliers. In general, the results for the individual spreads are 
consistent with those for the counterpart SVAR impulse response functions, although the 
estimates from the distributed lag regressions, which have more coefficients than the SVARs, 
have larger standard errors and are less smooth. For the wholesale fuels, the results are consistent 
with complete pass-through, although the estimates are imprecise. For the E85-E10 spread, the 
dynamic pass-through over these first three business weeks is precisely estimated to be small, 
and is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Also consistent with the previous results, there is 
also no evidence of pass-through from RIN prices to E10 prices. 
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Results for pooled distributed lag regressions are given in Table 8. The estimates are 
comparable to those from the SVARs, although (like the individual distributed lag estimates) 
have larger standard errors and are less smooth. 
Appendix Tables A1 and A2 present additional distributed lag specifications, including 
specifications in weekly differences to reduce the number of parameters and specifications that 
include changes in Brent prices (current and lagged) as additional control variables. These results 
are also consistent with the SVAR and daily distributed lag regressions presented in the text and 
show (a) general evidence of pass-through for the wholesale fuels, (b) that the 2013 data are 
more informative than the 2014-2015 data, (c) that some of the results, particularly for the 
gasoline spreads, are sensitive to controlling for seasonality, and in those cases the seasonal 
coefficients are typically statistically significant (so the seasonal specifications should be used), 
(d) there is little evidence that E10 prices move with RIN prices, and (e) the pass-through of RIN 
prices to E85 is small, and once seasonals are accounted for, is roughly zero.
 
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Taken together, these results support the view that RIN prices are passed through quickly, 
but not immediately, into the wholesale prices of obligated fuels. Based on the pooled, six-fuel 
SVAR, 57% of a shock to the price of the RIN obligation is passed through in the same day, 
rising to 97% after six business days (standard error of 31 percentage points). The pooled long-
run pass-through estimate is 1.01 with a standard error of 0.12. This rapid and complete pass-
through is consistent with economic theory and with efficiently operating wholesale fuels 
markets. 
The results for E10 are also consistent with economic theory: the net RIN obligation of 
E10 is negligible, and there is no statistically discernable movement of E10 prices with RIN 
prices. 
In contrast to these results, there appears to be little or no pass-through of RIN prices to 
E85 retail prices. Because the variation in the E85-E10 net RIN obligation price is very large 
during this sample, this absence of pass-through is precisely estimated, however whether the 
estimate is zero or roughly 30% depends on whether the results adjust seasonal fluctuations or 
not, respectively. The presence of seasonals in E10 prices and in the other fuels, and in the 
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physical composition of E85, suggests that seasonals should be included in the specifications, 
which leads to a precise estimate of no pass-through. 
This analysis is subject to several caveats. Throughout, identification of the pass-through 
coefficients is predicated on some aspect of exogeneity of RIN price movements, for example 
the SVAR analysis identifies unexpected changes in RIN prices as arising from features related 
to the RFS or biofuels markets. We argued that this is plausible given unique features of the 
biofuels market and the RFS during this data span, in which RIN prices fluctuated due to policy 
developments, fundamentally, changing perceptions of how the blend wall would be handled 
within the RFS program. To the extent that RIN prices moved because of broader economic or 
petroleum market developments that would directly affect the spreads, this identifying 
assumption would be brought into question. 
One implication of these results, discussed in detail in Burkholder (2015), is that an 
obligated party with a net RIN obligation, such as a merchant refiner, is able to recoup their RIN 
costs on average through the prices they receive in the wholesale market, although this 
mechanism would not be apparent on the balance sheet of the obligated party because there is no 
explicit revenue line item offsetting the explicit cost of purchasing RINs. Even with full pass-
through, however, an obligated party could face RIN price risk because of timing differences 
between when the RIN obligation is incurred and when RINs are acquired.  
To us, the most intriguing and challenging finding here is the near absence of pass-
through of RIN prices to retail E85 prices. While RIN prices might be passed through at some 
retail outlets at some times, this is not the case on average using national prices. The goal of the 
RFS program is to expand the use of low-carbon domestic biofuels, and the key economic 
mechanism to induce consumers to purchase high-renewables blends is the incentives provided 
by RIN prices. If the RIN price savings inherent in blends with high biofuels content are not 
passed on to the consumer, then this key mechanism of the RFS is not functioning properly. 
Obtaining a better understanding of the disconnect between fluctuations in RIN prices and pump 
E85 pricing is an important question for understanding how to achieve efficiently the goals of the 
RFS. 
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Figure 1. The RFS Nested Fuel Structure 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. Wholesale diesel fuel spreads and net RIN obligation. 
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Figure 4. Wholesale gasoline fuel spreads and net RIN obligation. 
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Figure 5. Retail E85-E10 spread and net RIN obligation. 
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Figure 6. Scatterplots: Wholesale diesel spreads vs. RIN obligation, weekly changes. 
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Figure 7. Scatterplots: Wholesale gasoline spreads vs. RIN obligation, weekly changes. 
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Figure 8. Scatterplots, retail fuels: E85-E10 vs. prior-week RIN obligation (top) and E10 price 
vs. prior-week net RIN obligation (bottom, NSA and SA), weekly changes. 
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Table 1. Spreads and prices: summary statistics 
 
 mean std. dev. min max 
Fuels and fuel spreads     
Gulf diesel – gulf jet 0.032 0.045 -0.111 0.165 
NY diesel – Rotterdam diesel 0.056 0.086 -0.074 0.464 
U.S. Gulf diesel – Rotterdam diesel -0.022 0.046 -0.225 0.100 
NY RBOB – Euro BOB 0.109 0.099 -0.171 0.484 
NY RBOB - Brent 0.264 0.147 -0.013 0.611 
Los Angeles RBOB – Brent 0.331 0.213 -0.123 1.095 
E85 – E10 -0.503 0.131 -0.759 -0.195 
E10 3.316 0.429 2.037 3.786 
Net RIN obligations     
RIN bundle (obligation on wholesale fuels) 0.056 0.023 0.013 0.142 
E85-E10 net RIN obligation -0.393 0.165 -1.026 -0.053 
 
Notes: Units are dollars. Statistics are evaluated over the full sample, Jan. 1, 2013 – March 10, 2015.  
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Table 2. Fuel spreads levels regressions and unit root/cointegration statistics 
 
 
Gulf diesel 
– Gulf jet 
NY diesel – 
Rott’m 
diesel 
U.S. Gulf 
diesel – 
Rott’m 
diesel 
NY RBOB – 
Euro BOB 
NY RBOB - 
Brent 
Los 
Angeles 
RBOB - 
Brent E85 – E10 
E85 – E10 
(one-
month lag) 
Regression coefficients (SEs):         
 
(1) OLS, full sample, seasonals 1.161*** 1.567*** 0.818*** 0.684** 1.089*** 0.720 -0.176* -0.058 
 (0.154) (0.424) (0.142) (0.332) (0.310) (0.704) (0.090) (0.099) 
(2) DOLS, full sample, 
seasonals 1.214*** 1.656*** 0.834*** 0.573* 1.025*** 0.735 -0.196** -0.066 
 (0.155) (0.459) (0.159) (0.307) (0.327) (0.730) (0.091) (0.107) 
(3) OLS, full sample, 
augmented seasonals 1.152*** 1.545*** 0.844*** 0.620** 1.068*** 0.676 -0.194** -0.050 
 (0.152) (0.411) (0.135) (0.266) (0.304) (0.613) (0.089) (0.097) 
(4) OLS, full sample, no 
seasonals 1.160*** 0.771 0.985*** 1.812*** 3.530*** 3.550*** 0.095 0.260** 
 (0.225) (0.521) (0.247) (0.416) (0.714) (1.268) (0.140) (0.107) 
 
(5) OLS, 2013, no seasonals 1.153*** 0.754*** 1.229*** 2.045*** 4.299*** 3.999*** 0.243* 0.376*** 
 (0.271) (0.153) (0.248) (0.377) (0.647) (1.238) (0.127) (0.078) 
(6) OLS, 2014-15, no 
seasonals 0.723 3.193* -0.021 0.073 -0.368 1.415 -0.839** -0.546** 
 (0.567) (1.634) (0.687) (1.122) (2.684) (5.881) (0.344) (0.254) 
Test statistics (no seasonals)         
F on seasonals (p-value) 11.38 3.27 6.45 28.35 42.69 29.48 14.40 8.56 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
DF-GLS, dependent variable -1.996** -2.916*** -1.744* -3.712*** -1.469 -2.060** -1.130 -1.130 
 
ADF, dependent variable -2.441 -3.410** -2.884** -4.002*** -2.481 -2.984** -3.021** -3.021** 
 
Engle-Granger cointegration -3.260* -3.435** -3.250* -4.359*** -2.605 -3.349** -3.162* -3.140* 
 
Notes: The data are daily and the full sample is Jan. 1, 2013 – March 10, 2015. In the OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the 
spread and the regressor is its net RIN obligation. The coefficient and standard error are on the level of the RIN-predicted spread. 
DOLS regressions additionally include five leads and five lags of the first difference of the RIN-predicted spread (coefficients not 
shown). The seasonal controls are sins and cosines evaluated at the first four seasonal frequencies, the augmented seasonals add the 
fifth and six seasonal frequencies. DOLS and OLS standard errors are Newey-West with 30 lags. The DF-GLS and ADF statistics test 
the null hypothesis that the dependent variable (the spread) has a unit root, against the alternative that it is stationary (intercept, no 
time trend, maximum of 6 lags, lagged determined by AIC); DF-GLS uses asymptotic critical values, ADF uses MacKinnon critical 
values. The Engle-Granger statistic is (the Engle-Granger augmented ADF) tests the null of no cointegration against the alternative of 
cointegration, using asymptotic critical values. Tests/coefficients are significant at the 
*
10% **5% ***10% significance level. 
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Table 3. Pooled levels regressions for wholesale spreads 
 
 
Diesel  Gasoline 
Diesel and 
Gasoline 
No. of spreads: 3 3 6 
Regression coefficients (SEs):    
 
(1) OLS, full sample, seasonals 1.182*** 0.831*** 1.006*** 
 (0.154) (0.269) (0.115) 
 
(2) DOLS, full sample, seasonals 1.235*** 0.777*** 1.006*** 
 (0.164) (0.283) (0.121) 
(3) OLS, full sample, augmented 
seasonals 1.180*** 0.788*** 0.984*** 
 (0.147) (0.260) (0.109) 
 
Notes: All regressions are of the form of the spread in levels against its RIN obligation in levels, with additional regressors. The 
coefficient on the levels is constrained to be the same for the spreads in the column pooled regression but the other coefficients are 
allowed to differ across spreads. Standard errors are Newey-West with 30 lags and allow both for own- and cross-serial correlation in 
the errors. Coefficients are significant at the 
*
10% **5% ***10% significance level. See the notes to Table 1. 
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Table 4.  Bivariate VARs for wholesale spreads: cumulative structural IRFs, with RIN obligation ordered first 
 
 
Gulf diesel – 
gulf jet 
NY diesel – Rott’m 
diesel 
Gulf diesel – 
Rott’m diesel NY RBOB - EBOB NY RBOB - Brent L.A. RBOB - Brent 
Lag             
0 0.450 (0.285) 0.637 (0.476) 0.619 (0.385) 0.484 (0.591) 1.272** (0.540) 0.585 (0.885) 
1 0.554* (0.313) 1.128* (0.605) 0.808** (0.403) 0.223 (0.697) 1.588** (0.681) 0.448 (1.178) 
2 0.892*** (0.340) 0.855 (0.697) 0.519 (0.411) 0.554 (0.785) 1.603** (0.783) 0.901 (1.385) 
3 0.611* (0.357) 1.279* (0.746) 1.102*** (0.423) 0.855 (0.823) 1.497* (0.841) 0.740 (1.516) 
4 0.825*** (0.284) 1.255* (0.707) 0.937*** (0.296) 0.939 (0.711) 1.406* (0.791) 0.744 (1.480) 
5 0.903*** (0.261) 1.340** (0.658) 0.846*** (0.261) 0.974 (0.631) 1.344* (0.728) 0.680 (1.382) 
6 1.004*** (0.232) 1.292** (0.596) 0.824*** (0.261) 0.953* (0.521) 1.298** (0.650) 0.668 (1.244) 
7 1.085*** (0.220) 1.304** (0.575) 0.869*** (0.260) 0.940** (0.469) 1.259** (0.612) 0.652 (1.158) 
8 1.143*** (0.215) 1.296** (0.565) 0.832*** (0.249) 0.925** (0.439) 1.221** (0.589) 0.641 (1.109) 
9 1.186*** (0.215) 1.303** (0.563) 0.813*** (0.249) 0.913** (0.427) 1.185** (0.579) 0.629 (1.084) 
10 1.218*** (0.216) 1.301** (0.564) 0.806*** (0.251) 0.900** (0.422) 1.150** (0.576) 0.617 (1.074) 
11 1.240*** (0.219) 1.299** (0.568) 0.798*** (0.253) 0.885** (0.421) 1.117* (0.576) 0.604 (1.073) 
12 1.254*** (0.221) 1.293** (0.574) 0.780*** (0.255) 0.869** (0.421) 1.085* (0.579) 0.592 (1.076) 
13 1.262*** (0.224) 1.286** (0.580) 0.767*** (0.259) 0.853** (0.422) 1.055* (0.583) 0.579 (1.083) 
14 1.264*** (0.227) 1.277** (0.587) 0.755*** (0.262) 0.836** (0.421) 1.027* (0.588) 0.567 (1.091) 
15 1.262*** (0.229) 1.266** (0.594) 0.742*** (0.265) 0.819* (0.419) 1.000* (0.593) 0.556 (1.098) 
             
Season-
als? Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Sample Full  Full  Full  Full  Full  Full  
 
Notes: Entries are cumulative structural impulse responses, with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Spreads and RIN 
obligations are specified in levels. The RIN price shock is identified by assuming it equals the RIN obligation price innovation (i.e. the 
RIN obligation ordered first in Cholesky factorization). Coefficients are significant at the *10% **5% ***1% level. 
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Table 5.  Pooled VARs: Cumulative structural impulse response functions, wholesale spreads 
 
 
Diesel  Gasoline Diesel and Gasoline 
# spreads 3 3 6 
Lag       
0 0.570** (0.265) 0.884* (0.519) 0.711*** (0.259) 
1 0.695** (0.319) 0.887 (0.670) 0.815** (0.326) 
2 0.893** (0.350) 0.999 (0.783) 1.044*** (0.368) 
3 0.885** (0.377) 0.994 (0.858) 0.948** (0.400) 
4 0.759* (0.393) 0.786 (0.904) 0.826** (0.418) 
5 0.866** (0.349) 0.763 (0.850) 0.896** (0.385) 
6 0.968*** (0.314) 0.759 (0.776) 0.992*** (0.351) 
7 1.052*** (0.286) 0.791 (0.678) 1.078*** (0.317) 
8 1.109*** (0.272) 0.800 (0.617) 1.141*** (0.300) 
9 1.163*** (0.264) 0.822 (0.568) 1.193*** (0.292) 
10 1.202*** (0.262) 0.833 (0.548) 1.231*** (0.290) 
11 1.233*** (0.264) 0.844 (0.542) 1.260*** (0.291) 
12 1.254*** (0.267) 0.848 (0.546) 1.279*** (0.293) 
13 1.267*** (0.271) 0.848 (0.551) 1.289*** (0.295) 
14 1.274*** (0.274) 0.844 (0.554) 1.293*** (0.297) 
15 1.277*** (0.277) 0.836 (0.553) 1.291*** (0.299) 
       
Seasonals? Y  Y  Y  
Sample Full  Full  Full  
 
 
Notes: Entries are cumulative structural impulse responses, with parametric bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. VARs for all 
indicated spreads are constrained to have the same coefficients, including the same impact coefficient. All VARs have 4 lags, 
exogenous seasonal controls, and are estimated in levels. The RIN price shock is identified by assuming it equals the RIN obligation 
price innovation (RIN obligation ordered first in Cholesky factorization). Coefficients are significant at the *10% **5% ***1% level. 
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Table 6.  Bivariate VARs for retail prices: cumulative structural IRFs, with RIN obligation ordered first 
 
 
E85-E10 E85-E10 E85-E10 
Weekly 
E85-E10 E10 
Lag           
0 -0.013 (0.036) -0.002 (0.036) -0.001 (0.039) -0.050 (0.070) 0.004 (0.012) 
1 -0.043 (0.053) -0.020 (0.054) -0.017 (0.056) 0.068 (0.117) 0.011 (0.023) 
2 -0.063 (0.064) -0.029 (0.067) -0.009 (0.066) 0.170 (0.159) 0.029 (0.033) 
3 -0.039 (0.073) 0.004 (0.078) 0.025 (0.073) 0.203 (0.188) 0.027 (0.043) 
4 -0.027 (0.076) 0.025 (0.084) 0.052 (0.075) 0.288 (0.212) 0.021 (0.052) 
5 -0.019 (0.075) 0.040 (0.086) 0.071 (0.072) 0.308 (0.222) 0.011 (0.060) 
6 -0.015 (0.074) 0.052 (0.086) 0.087 (0.069) 0.312 (0.222) 0.000 (0.066) 
7 -0.011 (0.073) 0.064 (0.086) 0.102 (0.068) 0.297 (0.216) -0.012 (0.071) 
8 -0.008 (0.073) 0.074 (0.086) 0.117* (0.069) 0.289 (0.214) -0.024 (0.075) 
9 -0.005 (0.074) 0.085 (0.087) 0.132* (0.070)   -0.037 (0.080) 
10 -0.001 (0.076) 0.094 (0.088) 0.147** (0.071)   -0.050 (0.084) 
11 0.002 (0.077) 0.104 (0.090) 0.160** (0.072)   -0.063 (0.088) 
12 0.005 (0.079) 0.113 (0.092) 0.173** (0.074)   -0.076 (0.093) 
13 0.007 (0.081) 0.122 (0.094) 0.186** (0.076)   -0.089 (0.098) 
14 0.010 (0.082) 0.130 (0.096) 0.198** (0.077)   -0.102 (0.102) 
15 0.012 (0.084) 0.138 (0.098) 0.209*** (0.079)   -0.115 (0.107) 
           
Seasonals? Y  N  N  N  Y  
Sample Full  Full  2013  Full  Full  
 
Notes: Entries are cumulative structural impulse responses, with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. For the E85-E10 spread, 
the variables are the spread and its net RIN obligation. For the E10 VAR, the variables are the E10 price and the D6 RIN price. All 
VARs with daily data are estimated in levels. The weekly VAR is estimated using end-of-week data, for weeks ending on Tuesdays, 
and is specified in first differences. The RIN price shock is identified by assuming it equals the RIN obligation price innovation (i.e. 
the RIN obligation ordered first in Cholesky factorization). Coefficients are significant at the *10% **5% ***1% level. 
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Table 7. Cumulative dynamic multipliers from distributed lag regressions of changes in spreads on changes in 
net RIN obligation 
 
  
Gulf diesel 
– Gulf jet 
NY diesel – 
Rott’m 
diesel 
U.S. Gulf 
diesel – 
Rott’m 
diesel 
NY RBOB – 
Euro BOB 
NY RBOB - 
Brent 
Los 
Angeles 
RBOB - 
Brent E85 – E10 E10 
Lag         
0 0.674** 0.639** 0.493 0.645 1.216** 0.646 -0.012 0.007 
 (0.287) (0.265) (0.330) (0.503) (0.511) (0.713) (0.025) (0.029) 
1 0.576** 0.960*** 0.737* 0.553 1.431** 0.380 -0.025 0.019 
 (0.242) (0.355) (0.378) (0.636) (0.648) (0.754) (0.040) (0.047) 
2 0.856*** 0.673* 0.437 1.145 1.263* 0.563 -0.033 0.039 
 (0.273) (0.395) (0.299) (0.767) (0.724) (0.815) (0.052) (0.062) 
3 0.609* 1.219*** 1.006*** 1.410 1.279* -0.145 0.003 0.042 
 (0.363) (0.388) (0.292) (0.927) (0.736) (1.291) (0.067) (0.076) 
4 0.724** 0.666 0.685** 1.042 0.757 0.427 0.052 0.037 
 (0.293) (0.482) (0.348) (0.908) (0.740) (1.258) (0.071) (0.087) 
5 0.706** 0.719 0.565 1.924 0.847 0.472 0.031 0.017 
 (0.327) (0.463) (0.366) (1.263) (0.854) (1.350) (0.069) (0.098) 
6 0.691* 0.429 0.520 2.401** 2.209** 0.466 0.044 0.007 
 (0.396) (0.662) (0.368) (1.120) (0.930) (1.579) (0.071) (0.106) 
7 0.985*** 0.708 1.098** 3.408** 2.385** 0.680 0.043 0.013 
 (0.349) (0.744) (0.430) (1.557) (0.953) (1.634) (0.078) (0.115) 
8 0.954* 0.817 1.020** 3.245** 2.527** 1.106 0.049 0.003 
 (0.536) (0.725) (0.488) (1.437) (1.001) (1.777) (0.096) (0.123) 
9 0.445 0.989 1.180*** 3.708** 3.213*** 0.109 0.091 0.015 
 (0.479) (0.794) (0.425) (1.565) (1.054) (1.966) (0.093) (0.130) 
10 0.896** 0.621 0.836* 3.224** 1.841* -1.076 0.132 0.011 
 (0.438) (0.752) (0.475) (1.596) (1.012) (2.037) (0.091) (0.134) 
11 0.779* 0.478 0.379 2.263 1.620 -1.464 0.142 0.008 
 (0.448) (0.820) (0.506) (1.382) (1.010) (1.913) (0.104) (0.139) 
12 1.132*** 0.639 0.938 2.599* 2.443** 0.025 0.120 0.008 
 (0.431) (0.917) (0.578) (1.564) (1.237) (2.226) (0.102) (0.144) 
13 1.221** 0.289 0.783 2.493* 2.498* 0.761 0.098 0.005 
 (0.520) (0.946) (0.667) (1.480) (1.285) (1.986) (0.106) (0.146) 
14 0.845* 0.574 0.856 1.392 2.154 -0.754 0.147 -0.006 
 (0.491) (0.977) (0.692) (1.628) (1.541) (2.179) (0.106) (0.148) 
15 1.363** 1.416 1.453** 2.164 2.552 -0.138 0.186* -0.019 
 (0.620) (0.987) (0.624) (1.656) (1.855) (2.482) (0.112) (0.152) 
         
Seasonals? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full 
 
Notes: Entries are cumulative dynamic multipliers and standard errors from distributed lag regressions of the change in the spread on 
the change in the net RIN obligation (contemporaneous value and 15 daily lags), including seasonal controls. The data are daily and 
the full sample is Jan. 1, 2013 – March 10, 2015. Standard errors are Newey-West with 15 lags. Significant at the *10% **5% ***1% 
level. 
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Table 8. Cumulative dynamic multipliers from constrained distributed lag regressions: Wholesale spreads 
 
 
Diesel Gasoline Diesel and Gasoline 
# spreads 3 3 6 
Lag       
0 0.597*** (0.219) 0.826** (0.380) 0.712*** (0.266) 
1 0.749*** (0.240) 0.766* (0.448) 0.758*** (0.290) 
2 0.630*** (0.211) 0.959** (0.488) 0.794*** (0.300) 
3 0.920*** (0.226) 0.838 (0.654) 0.879** (0.349) 
4 0.672*** (0.255) 0.731 (0.616) 0.702** (0.355) 
5 0.658** (0.260) 1.030 (0.779) 0.844** (0.411) 
6 0.563* (0.321) 1.667** (0.756) 1.115*** (0.425) 
7 0.918** (0.358) 2.085*** (0.782) 1.501*** (0.434) 
8 0.898** (0.386) 2.217*** (0.810) 1.557*** (0.453) 
9 0.876** (0.410) 2.303** (0.945) 1.590*** (0.549) 
10 0.774* (0.403) 1.291 (0.950) 1.033* (0.565) 
11 0.513 (0.401) 0.764 (0.936) 0.639 (0.544) 
12 0.925** (0.447) 1.714 (1.114) 1.319** (0.632) 
13 0.744 (0.478) 1.942* (1.009) 1.343** (0.597) 
14 0.801* (0.452) 1.035 (1.183) 0.918 (0.664) 
15 1.380** (0.574) 1.520 (1.460) 1.450 (0.888) 
       
Seasonals? Y  Y  Y  
Sample Full  Full  Full  
 
Notes: Spread regressions in a given column are constrained to have the same distributed lags across spreads; seasonal coefficients are 
not constrained to be the same across spreads. Estimation is by constrained OLS. Standard errors are Newey-West (15 lags). 
Coefficients are significant at the *10% **5% ***1% level.  
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table A-1a. Distributed lag regressions: Wholesale Gulf Diesel– Gulf Jet Fuel spread 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Change (days): 5-day 5-day 5-day 5-day 1-day 1-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 
Cumulative Impulse 
Response (SE) after 
lags:            
0     0.674** 0.672** 0.652**  0.642**  0.555 
     (0.287) (0.287) (0.273)  (0.251)  (1.045) 
1     0.576** 0.586** 0.537**  0.456*  0.616 
     (0.242) (0.258) (0.238)  (0.236)  (0.923) 
2     0.856*** 0.850*** 0.804***  0.915***  -0.127 
     (0.273) (0.272) (0.266)  (0.204)  (0.972) 
3     0.609* 0.549 0.544  0.881***  -1.423 
     (0.363) (0.358) (0.353)  (0.275)  (1.343) 
4     0.724** 0.736** 0.647**  0.750***  -0.064 
     (0.293) (0.302) (0.306)  (0.270)  (1.370) 
5     0.706** 0.680** 0.616*  0.783***  -0.474 
     (0.327) (0.326) (0.316)  (0.264)  (1.331) 
6     0.691* 0.588 0.586  0.847**  -1.083 
     (0.396) (0.428) (0.374)  (0.344)  (1.323) 
7     0.985*** 0.929** 0.866***  0.922***  0.132 
     (0.349) (0.379) (0.328)  (0.280)  (1.438) 
8     0.954* 0.879 0.818*  0.871**  0.071 
     (0.536) (0.563) (0.470)  (0.423)  (1.718) 
9     0.445 0.351 0.294  0.299  -0.226 
     (0.479) (0.535) (0.455)  (0.419)  (1.805) 
10     0.896** 0.868* 0.736*  0.914***  -0.335 
     (0.438) (0.482) (0.397)  (0.345)  (1.543) 
RIN obligationt 0.555*** 0.558*** 0.559*** 0.535**    0.633***  -0.101  
 (0.212) (0.209) (0.204) (0.223)    (0.211)  (0.684)  
RIN obligationt-5  0.034 0.019         
  (0.242) (0.254)         
            
Observations 551 551 551 551 549 549 549 253 251 298 298 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full 2013 2013 2014-15 2014-15 
Sum of coeffs (se) 0.555 0.592 0.578 0.535 1.363 1.212 1.144 0.633 1.296 -0.101 -0.179 
 0.212 0.306 0.320 0.223 0.620 0.698 0.463 0.211 0.416 0.684 1.989 
F (seasonals) 4.726 4.620 4.169  2.871 1.988      
p-val (seas) 1.28e-05 1.80e-05 7.46e-05  0.00391 0.0460      
F (lags)  0.0194 0.00580  1.249 1.158 1.290  1.290  1.290 
p-val (lags)  0.889 0.939  0.230 0.302 0.203  0.203  0.203 
F (Brent)   0.169   1.159      
p-val (Brent)     0.845     0.327           
 
Notes: The data are daily and the full sample is Jan. 1, 2013 – March 10, 2015. All regressions are of the form of a transformed spread 
(five-day or one-day differences) on the value of the RIN obligation for that spread (five-day or one-day differences), either 
contemporaneous or contemporaneous and lags. The first differences distributed lag specifications have 15 lags, the first ten 
cumulative dynamic multipliers are reported, and the 15-day cumulative multiplier is reported as “Sum of coeffs”; in regression (6), 
the current through fifth lag of the change in Brent prices are also included. Standard errors are Newey-West with 15 lags. Significant 
at the *10% **5% ***1% level.  
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Table A-1b. Distributed lag regressions: Wholesale New York Diesel – Rotterdam Diesel Spread 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Change (days): 5-day 5-day 5-day 5-day 1-day 1-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 
Cumulative Impulse 
Response (SE) after 
lags:            
0     0.639** 0.554** 0.608**  0.385  1.088 
     (0.265) (0.270) (0.265)  (0.280)  (0.804) 
1     0.960*** 0.853** 0.911***  0.665*  1.653 
     (0.355) (0.399) (0.337)  (0.380)  (1.110) 
2     0.673* 0.578 0.601  0.579*  0.360 
     (0.395) (0.445) (0.370)  (0.320)  (1.502) 
3     1.219*** 0.875** 1.122***  1.013***  1.301 
     (0.388) (0.438) (0.326)  (0.246)  (1.455) 
4     0.666 0.281 0.545  0.735***  -1.043 
     (0.482) (0.570) (0.463)  (0.279)  (2.934) 
5     0.719 0.392 0.566  0.394  0.993 
     (0.463) (0.530) (0.398)  (0.259)  (2.610) 
6     0.429 -0.211 0.238  0.181  -0.600 
     (0.662) (0.733) (0.590)  (0.348)  (3.790) 
7     0.708 -0.065 0.476  0.556  -1.157 
     (0.744) (0.864) (0.694)  (0.468)  (4.115) 
8     0.817 0.182 0.546  0.601  -1.165 
     (0.725) (0.912) (0.627)  (0.418)  (4.263) 
9     0.989 0.343 0.678  1.057**  -2.497 
     (0.794) (1.025) (0.714)  (0.453)  (4.305) 
10     0.621 0.100 0.280  0.399  -1.681 
     (0.752) (0.993) (0.656)  (0.472)  (4.334) 
RIN obligationt 0.714*** 0.703*** 0.672** 0.669***    0.579***  1.229  
 (0.234) (0.254) (0.279) (0.185)    (0.146)  (1.078)  
RIN obligationt-5  -0.119 -0.131         
  (0.516) (0.525)         
            
Observations 551 551 551 551 532 532 532 253 242 298 290 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full 2013 2013 2014-15 2014-15 
Sum of coeffs (SE) 0.714 0.583 0.541 0.669 1.416 0.630 0.827 0.579 0.969 1.229 -1.813 
 0.234 0.665 0.701 0.185 0.987 1.315 0.759 0.146 0.506 1.078 4.836 
F (seasonals) 0.886 0.854 0.865  0.593 0.604      
p-val (seas) 0.528 0.556 0.546  0.784 0.775      
F (lags)  0.0536 0.0623  1.276 1.212 1.263  1.263  1.263 
p-val (lags)  0.817 0.803  0.213 0.258 0.221  0.221  0.221 
F (Brent)   0.852   8.846      
p-val (Brent)     0.427     3.48e-09           
 
Notes: See the notes to Table A-1a. 
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Table A-1c. Distributed lag regressions: Wholesale Gulf Diesel – Rotterdam Diesel Spread 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Change (days): 5-day 5-day 5-day 5-day 1-day 1-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 
Cumulative Impulse 
Response (SE) after 
lags:            
0     0.493 0.437 0.475  0.283  0.841 
     (0.330) (0.354) (0.325)  (0.338)  (0.943) 
1     0.737* 0.657 0.706*  0.457  1.463 
     (0.378) (0.449) (0.371)  (0.419)  (0.971) 
2     0.437 0.348 0.393  0.399  0.290 
     (0.299) (0.388) (0.283)  (0.281)  (0.933) 
3     1.006*** 0.702* 0.952***  1.018***  0.572 
     (0.292) (0.365) (0.283)  (0.281)  (1.236) 
4     0.685** 0.353 0.621*  0.506*  1.345 
     (0.348) (0.412) (0.329)  (0.273)  (1.475) 
5     0.565 0.230 0.492  0.261  1.712 
     (0.366) (0.357) (0.350)  (0.282)  (1.638) 
6     0.520 -0.085 0.435  0.216  1.169 
     (0.368) (0.417) (0.349)  (0.345)  (1.264) 
7     1.098** 0.368 1.001**  0.699  2.047 
     (0.430) (0.451) (0.414)  (0.431)  (1.359) 
8     1.020** 0.340 0.912**  0.494  2.687 
     (0.488) (0.503) (0.437)  (0.387)  (1.701) 
9     1.180*** 0.515 1.061***  1.034***  1.056 
     (0.425) (0.532) (0.384)  (0.396)  (1.561) 
10     0.836* 0.307 0.709  0.555  1.810 
     (0.475) (0.580) (0.431)  (0.429)  (1.821) 
RIN obligationt 0.689*** 0.713*** 0.689*** 0.675***    0.659***  0.767  
 (0.159) (0.158) (0.166) (0.127)    (0.126)  (0.507)  
RIN obligationt-5  0.263 0.220         
  (0.194) (0.175)         
            
Observations 551 551 551 551 532 532 532 253 242 298 290 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full 2013 2013 2014-15 2014-15 
Sum of coeffs (SE) 0.689 0.976 0.909 0.675 1.453 0.608 1.294 0.659 0.996 0.767 2.520 
 0.159 0.258 0.240 0.127 0.624 0.734 0.530 0.126 0.460 0.507 2.499 
F (seasonals) 0.983 1.079 0.987  0.644 1.023      
p-val (seas) 0.448 0.376 0.445  0.740 0.417      
F (lags)  1.832 1.585  2.472 1.431 2.419  2.419  2.419 
p-val (lags)  0.176 0.209  0.00163 0.128 0.00209  0.00209  0.00209 
F (Brent)   1.065   10.67      
p-val (Brent)     0.345     0           
 
Notes: See the notes to Table A-1a. 
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Table A-1d. Distributed lag regressions: New York RBOB – Euro-BOB 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Change (days): 5-day 5-day 5-day 5-day 1-day 1-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 
Cumulative Impulse 
Response (SE) after 
lags:            
0     0.645 0.695 0.709  0.675  1.190 
     (0.503) (0.498) (0.512)  (0.515)  (1.471) 
1     0.553 0.519 0.660  0.563  0.290 
     (0.636) (0.582) (0.657)  (0.779)  (1.122) 
2     1.145 1.068 1.296*  1.486*  0.354 
     (0.767) (0.692) (0.755)  (0.821)  (1.438) 
3     1.410 1.466* 1.602*  1.868*  -0.173 
     (0.927) (0.840) (0.929)  (1.049)  (1.914) 
4     1.042 0.785 1.272  1.630*  -1.106 
     (0.908) (0.874) (0.886)  (0.960)  (1.849) 
5     1.924 1.611 2.198*  2.753**  -1.360 
     (1.263) (1.106) (1.199)  (1.201)  (2.147) 
6     2.401** 2.249** 2.721**  2.757**  1.673 
     (1.120) (0.997) (1.150)  (1.265)  (2.151) 
7     3.408** 2.920* 3.778**  4.632***  -2.218 
     (1.557) (1.504) (1.511)  (1.568)  (2.116) 
8     3.245** 2.548* 3.657**  4.136**  -0.077 
     (1.437) (1.337) (1.443)  (1.631)  (2.325) 
9     3.708** 3.210** 4.160***  4.794***  -0.715 
     (1.565) (1.453) (1.509)  (1.607)  (2.414) 
10     3.224** 2.650* 3.711**  4.485***  -1.384 
     (1.596) (1.575) (1.492)  (1.533)  (2.552) 
RIN obligationt 1.449** 1.646*** 1.720*** 1.716**    1.743**  1.528*  
 (0.672) (0.596) (0.544) (0.756)    (0.876)  (0.855)  
RIN obligationt-5  2.099*** 2.124***         
  (0.725) (0.639)         
            
Observations 551 551 551 551 532 532 532 253 242 298 290 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full 2013 2013 2014-15 2014-15 
Sum of coeffs (SE) 1.449 3.745 3.844 1.716 2.164 1.327 2.802 1.743 2.766 1.528 1.350 
 0.672 1.200 1.049 0.756 1.656 1.598 1.464 0.876 1.529 0.855 2.945 
F (seasonals) 1.223 1.033 1.172  0.690 0.915      
p-val (seas) 0.283 0.410 0.314  0.701 0.503      
F (lags)  8.378 11.06  1.608 2.310 1.648  1.648  1.648 
p-val (lags)  0.00395 0.000941  0.0674 0.00348 0.0579  0.0579  0.0579 
F (Brent)   4.798   4.332      
p-val (Brent)     0.00860     0.000283           
 
Notes: See the notes to Table A-1a. 
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Table A-1e. Distributed lag regressions: New York RBOB – Brent 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Change (days): 5-day 5-day 5-day 5-day 1-day 1-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 
Cumulative Impulse 
Response (SE) after 
lags:            
0     1.216** 1.154** 1.338***  1.263**  1.406 
     (0.511) (0.499) (0.497)  (0.539)  (1.139) 
1     1.431** 1.381** 1.638**  1.482*  2.015* 
     (0.648) (0.609) (0.645)  (0.777)  (1.089) 
2     1.263* 1.169 1.556**  1.707**  0.699 
     (0.724) (0.710) (0.702)  (0.830)  (1.063) 
3     1.279* 0.936 1.655**  1.829**  0.847 
     (0.736) (0.678) (0.741)  (0.882)  (1.337) 
4     0.757 0.449 1.218*  1.598**  -0.780 
     (0.740) (0.716) (0.719)  (0.755)  (1.757) 
5     0.847 0.526 1.392*  1.544*  0.498 
     (0.854) (0.867) (0.783)  (0.827)  (1.805) 
6     2.209** 1.568* 2.846***  2.597**  3.482** 
     (0.930) (0.890) (0.912)  (1.040)  (1.764) 
7     2.385** 1.686* 3.129***  3.352***  1.421 
     (0.953) (1.010) (0.927)  (1.082)  (2.044) 
8     2.527** 1.842* 3.374***  3.680***  1.186 
     (1.001) (1.020) (0.982)  (1.165)  (2.348) 
9     3.213*** 2.473** 4.155***  4.508***  2.109 
     (1.054) (1.078) (1.023)  (1.160)  (2.483) 
10     1.841* 1.311 2.867***  3.298***  0.304 
     (1.012) (1.107) (0.912)  (0.970)  (2.650) 
RIN obligationt 1.649*** 1.753*** 1.744*** 2.171***    2.324***  1.162  
 (0.615) (0.566) (0.558) (0.605)    (0.691)  (0.979)  
RIN obligationt-5  1.111*** 1.022***         
  (0.316) (0.306)         
            
Observations 551 551 551 551 549 549 549 253 251 298 298 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full 2013 2013 2014-15 2014-15 
Sum of coeffs (SE) 1.649 2.864 2.767 2.171 2.552 1.498 4.040 2.324 3.906 1.162 4.920 
 0.615 0.677 0.693 0.605 1.855 2.013 1.391 0.691 1.564 0.979 3.121 
F (seasonals) 2.128 1.635 1.661  1.103 1.294      
p-val (seas) 0.0317 0.112 0.105  0.360 0.244      
F (lags)  12.39 11.18  2.196 2.342 2.436  2.436  2.436 
p-val (lags)  0.000467 0.000883  0.00580 0.00298 0.00191  0.00191  0.00191 
F (Brent)   0.393   3.385      
p-val (Brent)     0.675     0.00277           
 
Notes: See the notes to Table A-1a. 
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Table A-1f. Distributed lag regressions: Los Angeles RBOB – Brent 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Change (days): 5-day 5-day 5-day 5-day 1-day 1-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 
Cumulative Impulse 
Response (SE) after 
lags:            
0     0.646 0.507 0.813  0.749  0.425 
     (0.713) (0.711) (0.691)  (0.746)  (1.808) 
1     0.380 0.293 0.662  0.515  1.419 
     (0.754) (0.776) (0.744)  (0.873)  (1.867) 
2     0.563 0.434 0.952  0.595  3.545** 
     (0.815) (0.768) (0.780)  (0.873)  (1.726) 
3     -0.145 -0.535 0.359  -0.246  3.746* 
     (1.291) (1.262) (1.222)  (1.206)  (2.115) 
4     0.427 0.201 1.042  0.514  4.569 
     (1.258) (1.276) (1.194)  (1.229)  (2.845) 
5     0.472 0.432 1.191  0.390  6.129** 
     (1.350) (1.333) (1.278)  (1.296)  (3.107) 
6     0.466 0.142 1.294  0.253  6.500** 
     (1.579) (1.633) (1.501)  (1.525)  (2.981) 
7     0.680 0.595 1.637  1.145  4.474 
     (1.634) (1.656) (1.568)  (1.673)  (4.457) 
8     1.106 1.342 2.188  2.020  3.219 
     (1.777) (1.806) (1.715)  (1.881)  (3.483) 
9     0.109 0.376 1.293  1.364  1.226 
     (1.966) (2.085) (1.857)  (1.931)  (4.517) 
10     -1.076 -0.374 0.205  -0.039  1.603 
     (2.037) (2.102) (1.910)  (1.918)  (5.611) 
RIN obligationt 0.443 0.463 0.344 1.013    0.764  2.530  
 (1.038) (1.091) (0.839) (0.975)    (1.017)  (2.225)  
RIN obligationt-5  0.209 0.497         
  (0.997) (0.966)         
            
Observations 551 551 551 551 549 549 549 253 251 298 298 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full 2013 2013 2014-15 2014-15 
Sum of coeffs (SE) 0.443 0.671 0.841 1.013 -0.138 0.631 1.660 0.764 1.374 2.530 3.752 
 1.038 1.815 1.498 0.975 2.482 2.784 2.010 1.017 2.066 2.225 5.631 
F (seasonals) 1.865 1.826 1.431  1.285 1.041      
p-val (seas) 0.0632 0.0697 0.180  0.249 0.404      
F (lags)  0.0438 0.265  2.267 2.316 2.656  2.656  2.656 
p-val (lags)  0.834 0.607  0.00420 0.00335 0.000666  0.000666  0.000666 
F (Brent)   5.814   5.030      
p-val (Brent)     0.00318     5.00e-05           
  
Notes: See the notes to Table A-1a. 
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Table A-2a. Distributed lag regressions: E85 – E10 spread 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Change (days): 5-day 5-day 5-day 5-day 1-day 1-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 
Cumulative Impulse 
Response (SE) after 
lags:            
0     -0.012 -0.014 -0.007  -0.008  -0.041 
     (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.075) 
1     -0.025 -0.027 -0.016  -0.009  -0.054 
     (0.040) (0.042) (0.039)  (0.044)  (0.093) 
2     -0.033 -0.032 -0.021  0.007  -0.180 
     (0.052) (0.054) (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.158) 
3     0.003 0.003 0.018  0.037  -0.108 
     (0.067) (0.068) (0.067)  (0.077)  (0.176) 
4     0.052 0.057 0.069  0.111  -0.191 
     (0.071) (0.069) (0.068)  (0.073)  (0.201) 
5     0.031 0.041 0.051  0.083  -0.165 
     (0.069) (0.066) (0.064)  (0.067)  (0.227) 
6     0.044 0.056 0.066  0.083  -0.097 
     (0.071) (0.068) (0.065)  (0.066)  (0.246) 
7     0.043 0.063 0.070  0.081  -0.019 
     (0.078) (0.075) (0.071)  (0.073)  (0.261) 
8     0.049 0.080 0.079  0.104  -0.095 
     (0.096) (0.092) (0.085)  (0.086)  (0.312) 
9     0.091 0.122 0.123  0.146*  -0.010 
     (0.093) (0.089) (0.083)  (0.084)  (0.312) 
10     0.132 0.160* 0.166**  0.171**  0.084 
     (0.091) (0.086) (0.081)  (0.079)  (0.337) 
RIN obligationt -0.035 -0.032 -0.033 0.004    0.019  -0.086  
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.043) (0.049)    (0.053)  (0.144)  
RIN obligationt-5  0.048 0.066         
  (0.047) (0.043)         
            
Observations 551 551 551 551 535 535 535 253 244 298 291 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full 2013 2013 2014-15 2014-15 
Sum of coeffs (SE) -0.0352 0.0162 0.0326 0.00434 0.186 0.238 0.233 0.0190 0.293 -0.0864 -0.162 
 0.0468 0.0825 0.0735 0.0491 0.112 0.108 0.0938 0.0528 0.0980 0.144 0.392 
F (seasonals) 4.516 3.937 2.792  2.974 2.258      
p-val (seas) 2.49e-05 0.000153 0.00490  0.00290 0.0224      
F (lags)  1.055 2.381  1.455 1.582 1.876  1.876  1.876 
p-val (lags)  0.305 0.123  0.117 0.0743 0.0233  0.0233  0.0233 
F (Brent)   3.093   1.746      
p-val (Brent)     0.0462     0.108           
 
Notes: See the notes to Table A-1a. 
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Table A-2b. Distributed lag regressions: E10 (dependent variable is change in D6 RIN price) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Change (days): 5-day 5-day 5-day 5-day 1-day 1-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 5-day 1-day 
Cumulative Impulse 
Response (SE) after 
lags:            
0     0.007 0.004 0.023  0.034  -0.047 
     (0.029) (0.023) (0.024)  (0.028)  (0.045) 
1     0.019 0.016 0.047  0.070  -0.081 
     (0.047) (0.035) (0.036)  (0.044)  (0.070) 
2     0.039 0.038 0.078*  0.102*  -0.070 
     (0.062) (0.045) (0.046)  (0.055)  (0.103) 
3     0.042 0.042 0.091  0.119*  -0.094 
     (0.076) (0.056) (0.056)  (0.064)  (0.147) 
4     0.037 0.047 0.097  0.124*  -0.096 
     (0.087) (0.063) (0.064)  (0.074)  (0.186) 
5     0.017 0.037 0.088  0.120  -0.130 
     (0.098) (0.070) (0.072)  (0.085)  (0.200) 
6     0.007 0.035 0.089  0.129  -0.181 
     (0.106) (0.077) (0.077)  (0.091)  (0.235) 
7     0.013 0.061 0.107  0.145  -0.140 
     (0.115) (0.086) (0.084)  (0.101)  (0.267) 
8     0.003 0.072 0.110  0.146  -0.137 
     (0.123) (0.092) (0.091)  (0.109)  (0.301) 
9     0.015 0.090 0.134  0.174  -0.151 
     (0.130) (0.098) (0.098)  (0.113)  (0.350) 
10     0.011 0.093 0.140  0.184  -0.177 
     (0.134) (0.103) (0.099)  (0.117)  (0.356) 
RIN obligationt 0.042 0.041 0.030 0.099    0.144**  -0.184  
 (0.081) (0.085) (0.053) (0.061)    (0.068)  (0.183)  
RIN obligationt-5  -0.018 0.021         
  (0.058) (0.036)         
            
Observations 551 551 551 551 551 551 551 253 253 298 298 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full 2013 2013 2014-15 2014-15 
Sum of coeffs (SE) 0.0420 0.0231 0.0509 0.0986 -0.0187 0.111 0.165 0.144 0.241 -0.184 -0.351 
 0.0812 0.139 0.0848 0.0606 0.152 0.121 0.123 0.0679 0.141 0.183 0.504 
F (seasonals) 5.721 5.502 4.446  5.348 3.581      
p-val (seas) 5.27e-07 1.07e-06 3.12e-05  1.78e-06 0.000466      
F (lags)  0.0919 0.330  1.575 1.354 1.376  1.376  1.376 
p-val (lags)  0.762 0.566  0.0760 0.165 0.154  0.154  0.154 
F (Brent)   48.12   21.21      
p-val (Brent)     0     0           
 
Notes: See the notes to Table A-1a. 
 
